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I.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

1.

Nature of the Case.
Appellant George Hansen herewith appeals the Order of the District Court of the

Seventh Judicial District, the Honorable Darren B. Simpson presiding, entered on June
10, 2008, denying Hansen's Motion for Relief from Default Judgment brought pursuant
to Rule 55(c) l.R.C.P .. (R. Vol. II, pp. 201-211) Based on a default judgment entered in
1993, the Respondent, Ann T. Meyers, in this action is attempting to satisfy a judgment,
entered on September 25, 2001 (R. Vol. I, pp. 55-56), against George Hansen, whose
only source of income is his pension and social security. The judgment arises from a
default that was taken against George Hansen while he was in Federal Prison. (R. Vol. I,
pp. 1, 28)

He was not released from Federal Prison until 1995. (R. Vol. I, p. 92) The

primary party Defendant who was sued in this action to recover what the Plaintiff
allegedly lost in an investment proposal was Jack Lott. (R. Vol. I, p. 18) The Plaintiff
lost her case against Jack Lott on the merits at trial (R. Vol. I, p. 48) and is now seeking
to collect on the default against Mr. Hansen and his spouse Connie Hansen. (R. Vol. I, p.
57) Mr. Hansen contends that he was not properly notified of the Default Judgment
entered against him (R. Vol. I, pp. 89-90) and did not discover this until it was renewed
five (5) years later. (R. Vol. I, pp. 92-93)

2.

Course of Proceedings Below.
The Plaintiff filed her case against Jack Lott and George Hansen on February 2,

1993. (R. Vol. I, p. 1) At the time this suit was filed, Mr. Hansen was in Federal Prison
in Fredericksburg, Virginia. Mr. Hansen was served in Federal Prison on August 23,
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1993. (R. Vol. I, p. 27 .) A Motion and Order for Entry of Default of George Hansen was
entered on September 12, 1993. (R. Vol. I, p. 28) A Final Judgment, Order and Decree
was entered on December 4, 2000, "dismissing the complaint with prejudice." (R. Vol. I,
pp. 48-49) On September 25, 2001, Plaintiff filed an Ex Parte Application for Default
Judgment against George Hansen allegedly pursuant to Rule 55(b)(2) I.R.C.P. (R. Vol. I,
p. 50) The Ex Parte Application for Default Judgment did not contain any written
certification of any address for George Hansen whatsoever as required under Rule
55(b)(2). (R. Vol. I, p. 50) Further, no three (3) day notice of application for entry of
default to George Hansen or certificate of service or notice of service to George Hansen
was filed with or in support of the Ex Parle Application for Default as required by
I.R.C.P. 55(b)(2). In May of 2006, the Plaintiff renewed her default judgment against
Mr. Hansen (R. Vol. I, p. 57) and began collection proceedings. Mr. Hansen learned of
the default against him in April of 2007. (R. Vol. I, p. 93) On April 25, 2007, John L.
Runft appeared as counsel for George Hansen. (R. Vol. I, p. 61) A Motion for Relief
from Default Judgment under Rule 55(c) I.R.C.P. was filed by counsel for George
Hansen on Febrnary 27, 2008 (R. Vol. I, p. 73) and was heard by Judge Simpson on
February 28, 2008. On June 10, 2008, Judge Simpson entered his Memorandum Opinion
and Order Denying Defendant Hansen's Motion for Relief from Default Judgment. (R.
Vol. II, p. 201) George Hansen then filed his Notice of Appeal herein on July 18, 2008.
3.

Statement of Facts.

George Hansen was the operator of Ideal Consultants and/or George Hansen and
Associates, which sold investment loans. Mr. Hansen worked with Jack and Kathleen
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Lott and John and Marilyn Scoresby. James and Ann Meyers were clients that invested a
total of$349,350.00.
George Hansen was in federal prison in Fredericksburg, Virginia serving a four
year sentence when the case was filed in June 8, I 993 by James and Ann Meyers. Mr.
Hansen acknowledges that the record shows that he was personally served with service of
process in federal prison on August 8, 1993; however, he has no recollection of being
personally served. (R. Vol. I, p 92) While Mr. Hansen was in federal prison he did not
have the capacity or resources to obtain legal counsel to defend himself. Mr. Hansen was
released from federal prison in I 995.
Mr. Hansen was subpoenaed for his deposition on April 3, 1997. (R. Vol. I, p. 27)
On March 21, 1997, a notice of his audio visual deposition was filed with the court. Mr.
Hansen appeared pro se in this case pursuant to said subpoena when his deposition was
taken by Plaintiffs counsel Walter Bithell on April 24, 1997. (R. Vol. II, pp. 99-161)
Mr. Hansen was under the impression that he was not a party to the case at that time. (R.
Vol. I, pp. 92, 142) At that deposition, Mr. Hansen testified that he had not discussed the
deposition with any attorney and was not represented at the deposition by any lawyer. (R.
Vol. II, p. 100) No attorney at the deposition admonished Mr. Hansen that he was still a
party in the case. (R. Vol. 1I, pp. 98-164.)
On July 16, 1999, the Plaintiff filed an Ex Parte Application for Default Judgment
against George Hansen with supporting memorandum and an Affidavit of Ann Meyers.
No three (3) day notice of application for entry of default to George Hansen or certificate
of service or notice of service to George Hansen was filed with the Ex Parte Application
for Default as required by l.R.C.P 55(b)(2). (R. Vol. I, p. 89)
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Mr. Hansen received no

notice of this Application for Default (R. Vol. I, pp. 91-94). No default judgment was
entered pursuant to this Application.
After the Plaintiff, Mrs. Meyers lost her case at trial following remand on appeal
to this Court (R. Vol. I, p.l), final judgment was entered on December 4, 2000. (R. Vol. I,
pp. 1, 48). The District Court's final judgment orders that 'judgment is entered in favor
of Jack Lott and Kathleen Lott and against plaintiffs Anne T. Meyers and the estate of
James R. Meyers, dismissing the complaint with prejudice." (R. Vol. I, pp. 48A9) The
final judgment was never amended to limit the dismissal with prejudice to the Lott's.
Approximately one year later on September 25, 2001, Mrs. Meyer filed another
Application for Default Judgment against Mr. Hansen on September 25, 2001. (R. Vol. I,
pp. 1, 50) Pursuant to said Application, the District Court entered a Default Judgment
against George Hansen that same day. (R. Vol. I, pp. 1, 55) As mentioned above,
however, no three (3) day notice of application for entry of default against George
Hansen was filed and no certificate of service or notice of service to George Hansen of
the Default Judgment was entered or recorded as required by I.R.C.P 55(b)2. Further, the
Application for Default was procedurally deficient in that it contained no written
certification of the address for Mr. Hansen for service of the default as expressly required
by I.R.C.P 55(b)(2). (R. Vol. I, pp. 50-51) Mr. Hansen received no notice oft11is second
Application for Default or of the entry of the Default Judgment. (R. Vol. I, pp. 89-90,
91-92.) No effort was made to enforce the judgment or to notify Mr. Hansen of its
existence until after the judgment was renewed five (5) years later. (R. Vol. I, pp. 92-93)
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In May of 2006, the Plaintiff renewed her default judgment against Mr. Hansen
and began collection proceedings. Mr. Hansen learned of the default against him in April
of2007 and made an appearance in the case at such time.

II.
ISSUES ON APPEAL
Appellant raises these four issues on appeal:
1.

Whether Appellant Hansen's constitutional rights to due process were
violated thereby rendering the default judgment void, where he received
no notice of a default judgment entered against him until more than five
years after the case was dismissed with prejudice as a result of
Respondents' failure to certify any address for Mr. Hansen to the clerk of
the court in the application for default judgment as required under Rule
55(b)(2).

2.

Whether Mr. Hansen is entitled to relief under I.R.C.P. 60(b)(4) from the
default judgment entered against him for failure of the Respondents to
provide Mr. Hansen with the proper three day notice of Respondents'
application for default judgment, and to provide the clerk of the court
Hansen's address for service of the default judgment, as required by
I.R.C.P. 55(b)(2) in violation of Mr. Hansen's federal and state due
process rights.

3.

Whether Mr. Hansen is entitled to relief under I.R.C.P. 60(b)(5) from the
default judgment entered against him on the grounds that the default
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judgment should not have prospective application, because of the lack of
notice to Hansen of entry of the default judgment for over five years after
entry of said judgment as a result of Respondents' failure to certify any
address for Mr. Hansen to the clerk of the court in the application for
default judgment as required under Rule 55(b )(2).
4.

Whether, even if notice to Hansen of the default judgment were deemed to
be sufficient, the default judgment is valid in light of dismissal "of the
complaint with prejudice" and Meyers' failure to timely modify said
dismissal under Rule 59 I.R.C.P. so as to limit the effect of the dismissal
to Defendants Lotts and exclude Defendant Hansen.

III.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Generally, a trial court's refusal to set aside a default judgment is reviewed under
an abuse of discretion standard. Suitts v. Nix, 141 Idaho 706, 708, 117 P.3d 120, 122
(2005); Avon_dale on Hayden, Inc. v. Hall, 104 Idaho 321, 658 P.2d 992 (Ct. App. 1983)
The decision will be upheld if it appears that the trial court (1) correctly perceived the
issue as discretionary, (2) acted within the boundaries of its discretion and consistent with
the applicable legal standards, and (3) reached its determination through an exercise of
reason. Flood v. Katz, 143 Idaho 454, 456-57, 147 P.3d 86, 88-89 (2006). Under Rule
55(c) I.R.C.P., the applicable legal standard is set forth in I.R.C.P. 60(b), which allows a
default judgment to be set aside where it is, inter alia, "void," (Rule 60(b )(4)) or "it is no
longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application." Rule 60(b)(5)
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When a determination nnder Rule 60(b2 turns large! y on questions of fact to be
determined by the trial court, those factual findings will be upheld unless they are clearly
erroneous. Nevertheless, because judgments by default are not favored, relief should be
granted in doubtful cases. Sititts, 141 Idaho at 708, 117 P.3d at 122, If the trial court
applies the facts in a logical manner to the criteria set forth in Rule 60(b), while keeping
in mind the policy favoring relief in doubtful cases, the court will be deemed to have
acted within its discretion. Id.; see Shelton v. Diamond Int'!. Corp., 108 Idaho 935, 938,
703 P.2d 699, 702 (1985). The adequacy of notice is a factor to be considered in this
regard. See, Farber v. Howell, 105 Idaho 57,665 P.2d 1067, 1069 (1983).
Constitutional issues and the construction and application of legislative acts are
pure questions oflaw over which the Supreme Court exercises free review. State v. Hart,
135 Idaho 827, 829, 25 P.3d 850, 852 (2001); Struhs v. Protection Technologies, Inc.,
133 Idaho 715,992 P.2d 164 (1999); Meisner v. Potlatch Corp., 131 Idaho 258,260,954
P.2d 676, 678 (1998). Due process issues are generally questions of law, and this Court
exercises free review over questions of law. Idaho Historic Pres. Council, Inc. v. City
Council of City ofBoise, 134 Idaho 651,654, 8 P.3d 646,649 (2000).
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IV.
ARGUMENT
1. Hansen's Constitutional Right to Due Process Was Violated as a Result of

Respondents' Failure to Certify an Address for Mr. Hansen to the Clerk of the
Court in the Application for Default Judgment as Required Under Rule SS(b)(2).
Rule 55(b)(2) I.R.C.P. requires that an application for default contain a "written
certification of the name of the party against whom judgment is requested and the
address most likely to give him notice of such default, and the Clerk shall use such
address in giving such party notice of judgment."
The September 2001 Application for Default contains no address for Mr. Hansen.
The Application does state it is based upon the July 7, 1999 Affidavit of Ann Meyers
filed in this action; however, this document does not contain any address for Mr. Hansen.
As a consequence, the Clerk of the Court was unable to act as mandated under that Rule
and give George Hansen notice of the default judgment. See Affidavit of Bonneville
County district court clerk Rhonda Quintana. (R. Vol. I, pp. 89-90) Mr. Hansen also has
testified in his affidavit in support of his Motion for Relief from Default Judgment that he
never received notice of any kind in regard to the entry of the Default Judgment against
him. (R. Vol. I, pp. 92-93)

This failure of notice under Rule 55(b)(2) is a failure of

procedural due process and therefore a question of law. Idaho Historic Pres. Council,

Inc. v. City Council of City ofBoise, 134 Idaho 651, 654, 8 P .3d 646, 649 (2000).
Procedural due process requires that some process be provided to ensure that the
individual is not arbitrarily deprived of his or her rights in violation of the state or federal
constitutions. Spenser v. Kootenai County, 145 Idaho 448, 180 P. 3d 487 (2008); Cowan
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v. Bd. ofComm'rs of Fremont County, 143 Idaho 501, 508-510, 148 P.3d 1247, 1254-

1256 (2006). The U.S. Supreme Court has stated that the identification of the specific
dictates of due process generally requires consideration of three distinct factors: the
private interest that will be affected by the official action (or omission); the risk of an
erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used (or omitted), and the
probative value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards and the
Government's interest therein, including the function involved and the fiscal and
administrative burdens that the additional or substitute requirements would entail.
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35, 96 S.Ct. 893, 902-03, 47 L.Ed.2d 18, 32-33

(1976), cited in Gay v. County Comm'rs of Bonneville County, 103 Idaho 626, 628-29,
651 P.2d 560, 562-63 (Ct. App. 1982). Here, this failure of notice and consequential
breach of Mr. Hansen's due process rights are the direct, logical consequence of the
"risk" of Meyer's failure to follow the requirement in Rule 55(b)(2) that an address for
service be provided with an application for default.

The added risk manifested by

Meyer's failure is that the Clerk of the Court was rendered incapable of doing her
mandated official duty of serving notice to Mr. Hansen of entry of the judgment.
Ensuring that proper notice is provided is the very the reason for the Rule, the
violation of which rendered the judgment voidable. In Farber v. Howell, I 05 Idaho 57,
665 P.2d 1067, 1069 (1983), the Court held that default judgments based upon faulty
procedure are voidable. In that case a default judgment was held to be voidable for
failure to comply with Rule 55(b)(2), requiring that party against whom judgment by
default is sought be served with written notice of application for judgment at least three
days prior to hearing on application.
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The Application for Default herein and the

subsequent Default Judgment were inherently constitutionally deficient in that their
combined operation, Mr. Hansen was faced with a judgment about which he had no
knowledge at under the circumstances that the passage of time deprived him of the
opportunity to mount any meaningful defense.
This is not a case of a failed attempt to give notice. This is a failure to even
attempt to provide Mr. Hansen notice of the entry of a default judgment. Meyers waited
four and a half years before alerting Mr. Hansen that a default judgment had been entered
against him on a default that had been entered 13 years earlier on a complaint that had
been dismissed with prejudice five and a half years earlier.

A default amount of

$299,350 in 1993 grew to the sum of$732,927 when the defaultjudgment was entered on
September 25, 2001 (R. Vol. I, pp. 52-54) and continued to grow at the rate of 9% per
annum until the Order for Renewed Judgment was entered on May 16, 2006 from which
time it has continued to accrue interest at the Idaho statutory rate. Given the lack of
notice and the passage of time that has directly resulted from the failure to provide a
certified address for Mr. Hansen to the Clerk of the Court, Mr. Hansen now faces a
massive and growing debt, is unable to mount any credible defense because documents
and witnesses are no longer available, and is time blocked from raising any I.R.C.P.
60(b)(l)(2)(3) or (6) defenses as the 6 month time had clearly expired. For the same
reasons, Mr. Hansen could not attempt under I.R.C.P. 59(b) to litigate the case on the
merits. The combination of Meyers' negligence and delay has deprived Mr. Hansen of
any ability to defend the case or seek any relief other then this action to vacate the default
judgment. Mr. Hansen respectfully submits that this Court should find that under the
principles discussed above, the judgment in this case is void as a matter of law, because
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the lack of notice and delay directly arising from Meyer's failure to comply with Rule 55
(b)(2) resulted in the violation of Mr. Hansen's due process rights. For this reason, the
Default Judgment should be voided by this Court.
(a) Due Process Requirements for Rendering a Default Judgment "Void" or
"Voidable.

Federal courts have made distinctions between void and voidable judgments
regarding due process challenges against judgments, and it is the latter that invokes the
reasonable time requirement. As stated in Days Inns Worldwide, Inc. v. Patel, 445 F .3d
899, 907 (6th Cir. 2006):
Care should also be taken not to confuse 'void' judgments with
those which are merely 'voidable'. Certain procedural
irregularities, not amounting to lack of jurisdiction over the
person or subject matter, are sometimes characterized as making
a judgment 'voidable'. This means that these judgments may be
set aside upon a timely application in the same proceedings as a
matter of judicial discretion.
Federal courts in the various circuits have struggled with determining what due
process violations make a judgment void instead of merely voidable. For instance, some
authorities have held that a default judgment taken in violation of F.R.C.P. 55(b)(2)'s
three-day notice requirement is an automatically void judgment which must be set aside
as violating the federal due process clause. See Cargill, Inc. v. Cohen, 115 F.R.D. 259,
261 (M.D. Ga. 1987); Savoretti v. Rodriguez-Jiminez, 252 F.2d 290,291 (5th Cir. 1958);
Press v. Forest Laboratories, Inc., 45 F.R.D. 354, 357 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). Others have

held such judgments to be at least voidable.

See, Traveltown, Inc. v. Gerhardt

Investment Group, 577 F. Supp. 155, 157 (N.D.N.Y. 1983); Trust Company Bank v.
Tingen-1vlillford Drapery Company, Inc., 119 F.R.D. 21, 23 (E.D.N.C. 1987).
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The Ninth Circuit has held such judgments to be void.

See Direct Mail

Specialists, Inc. v. Eclat Computerized Technologies, Inc., 840 F.2d 685 (9 th Cir. 1988).

The leading cases on constitutional due process challenges under Fed. R. Civ. P.
60(b)(4) are Fehlhaber v. Fehlhaber, 681 F.2d 1015 (5th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 818 (1983), and Bass v. Hoagland, 172 F.2d 205 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S.
816 (1949). In Fehlhaber the court directly addressed the requirements for due process
challenges that would render a judgment void. The court stated:
The due process requirements in a civil case where only property
interests are at stake are, of course, much less stringent than in a
criminal case involving life and liberty interests. Thus ordinarily
all that due process requires in a civil case is proper notice and
service of process and a court of competent jurisdiction; procedural
irregularities during the course of a civil case, even serious ones,
will not subject the judgment to collateral attack. See Windsor v.
McVeigh, 93 U.S. 274,282, 23 L.Ed. 914 (1876); 7 Moore's, supra,
at P 60.25(2), p. 309-10. However, "a departure from established
modes of procedure (can) render the judgment void," Windsor,
supra, 93 U.S. at 283, where the procedural defects are of
sufficient magnitude to constitute a violation of due process, or, as
sometimes more circularly put, where the defects are "so unfair as
to deprive the ... proceedings of vitality," Eagles v. US., 329 U.S.
304, 314, 67 S.Ct. 313,319, 91 L.Ed. 308 (1946), or where the
procedural irregularities are serious enough to be deemed
"jurisdictional," Yale v. National Indemnity Co., 602 F.2d 642, 644
(4th Cir. 1979); Recent Cases, 62 Harv.L.Rev. 1400, 1401 (1949).
See generally Restatement of the Law of Judgments s 8 (1942).
The leading case allowing collateral attack of a default judgment
for procedural errors during the course of a jurisdictionally proper
proceeding is Bass v. Hoagland, 172 F.2d 205 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 359 U.S. 816, 70 S.Ct. 57, 94 L.Ed. 494 (1949), noted in
Recent Cases, 62 Harv.L.Rev. 1400. In Bass the plaintiff sued to
enforce a default judgment obtained in another federal court. In the
original trial court the defendant appeared, answered, and
requested a jury trial. Defense counsel then withdrew. On the day
of trial defendant was not present. The trial judge treated the
defendant in default because of the earlier withdrawal of his
counsel and entered judgment for the plaintiff in the precise
amount requested in his complaint, without a jury trial and
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apparently without taking any evidence. Defendant was not aware
of the trial date, was given no notice prior to the entry of the
default judgment, and was fraudulently not informed of the
judgment until more than two years after it was entered. The court
held that the combination of these errors resulted in a denial of due
process.
681 F.2d at I 027 (footnote omitted).
Federal courts have held failure to provide notice of key events in civil cases to
be sufficient error so as to deprive those proceeding of vitality.
The federal case law demonstrates that a state judgment is void if under the
combined circumstances leading up to it, a party was denied due process.
(b) Default Judgments Violating Non-Jurisdictional Due Process Can Be
Void.

Hansen has maintained throughout that the default judgment herein is void for
violation of Hansen's rights to due process, based on statements of the default order, the
failure to serve or otherwise notify Hansen of the entry of the default judgment, and the
consequential deprivation of Hansen of his Rule 60(b) rights and remedies. Meyers
contends that non-jurisdiction due process violations can only render a default judgment
voidable instead of void, citing Days Inns Worldwide, Inc. v. Patel, 445 F.3d 899 (2006)
in support. This contention contradicts controlling legal authority.
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals explained its position on this issue in the case
of In re Center Wholesale, 759 F.2d 1440, 1448 (9th Cir.1985), in pertinent part as
follows:
[A judgment] is void only if the court that rendered judgment [l]
lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter, or [2] of the parties, or [31
if the court acted in a manner inconsistent with due process of
law. See 11 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and
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Procedure§ 2862 at 198-200 (1973) and cases cited therein. Id Id.
(emphasis added).
Under circumstances where "the court acted in a manner inconsistent with due
process of law," the Ninth Circuit has not imposed the additional condition that a
judgment must also violate a jurisdictional requirement in order to be rendered void.
Indeed, such a statement would render the first and second ways a judgment can become
void redundant. The Ninth Circuit has adopted a rule in this regard that specifically
contemplates non-jurisdictional due process violations as being able to render a judgment
void. A judgment is not void merely because it is erroneous. It is void only if the court
that rendered judgment lacked jurisdiction of the subject matter, or of the parties, or if the
court acted in a manner inconsistent with due process of law. See 11 C. Wright & A.
Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2862 at 198-200 (1973) and cases cited
therein. As brought out herein below, this is the position taken by the majority of federal
circuits, including the First, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh and D.C. Circuits.
Given the Ninth Circuit's definite determination in this respect of the constitutional limits
and treatment of defective default judgments, contrary examples from other circuits will
not be pertinent.

(c) The Default Judgment Should be Set Aside for Being Void for Due
Process Violation Under Rule 60(b)(4) l.R.C.P., Regardless of the
Passage of Time Since Service on Hansen of the Order for Renewed
Judgment.
Voidness based on due process can be raised at any time in proceedings. At one
point in the proceedings below, the District Court expressed its opinion that Mr. Hansen's
motion for relief on grounds of due process would be denied under Rule 60(b)(4)
APPELLANT'S BRIEF -Page 14

l.R.C.P., because it was not brought within a "reasonable time" as determined by the
court. It appears that the district court may still be of that opinion on page 5 and/or page
9 of its Memorandum Opinion below (R. Vol. II, pp. 205-209). Previously, the court
based its view on the decision in the case of Wright v. Wright, 130 Idaho 918, 950 P.2d
1257 (1998). However, that case dealt with an I.R.C.P. 60(b)(4) challenge to a judgment
for violating l.R.C.P. 1 l(b) and not a due process challenge under 60(b)(4). A federal
constitutional challenge brought under I.R.C.P. 60(b)(4) may be made at any time and the
"reasonable time" and Wright case do not apply.
The right to procedural due process guaranteed under both the United States and
Idaho Constitutions requires that a person involved in the judicial process be given
meaningful notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407
U.S. 67, 92 S.Ct. 1983, 32 L.Ed.2d 556 (1972); Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 91
S.Ct. 780, 28 L.Ed.2d 113 (1971); Mays v. District Court, 34 Idaho 200, 200 P. 115
(1921 ). It has long been the law that except for that limited class of actions which are
strictly in rem, a decree is not, and cannot be made, conclusive, as to parties who are
strangers to it. 15 R. L. C. Judgments, § 481, p. 1006; 12 C. J. Const. Law,§ 1003, p.
1227; Ray v. Norseworthy, 23 Wall. 128, 23 L. Ed. 116; In re Sharp, 15 Idaho, 120, 96
Pac. 563, 18 L. R. A. (N. S.) 886.
I.R.C.P. 60(b)(4) provides that "[o]n motion and upon such terms as are just, the
court may relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or
proceeding for the following reasons: ... (4) the judgment is void." The rule requires that
a 60(b)(4) motion "be made within a reasonable time." As explained above, this motion
is certainly brought within a reasonable time, since, if a judgment is void, a motion to set
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it aside may be brought at any time. See, 11 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice
and Procedure§ 2862 at 197 (1973) and cases cited therein. Moreover, George Hansen

had no knowledge of the judgment for over a half a decade after it had been entered,
which entry of judgment itself was over eight years after the default had been entered.
Further, a void judgment cannot somehow acquire validity because of !aches on the part
of the judgment debtor (discussed below). "A judgment is not void merely because it is
erroneous. It is void only if the court that rendered judgment lacked jurisdiction of the
subject matter, or of the parties, or if the court acted in a manner inconsistent with due
process oflaw." In re Center Wholesale, Inc., 759 F.2d 1440, 1448 (9th Cir.1985).
As illustrated above, the Application for Default failed to contain a certified
address for Mr. Hansen (I.R.C.P. 55(b)(2)), and, as a direct result of this failure to follow
this procedural requirement, the default judgment was never sent to him by the Clerk of
the Court as required under I.R.C.P. 55(b)(2).

Further, Mr. Hansen was also not

provided with the required three (3) day notice under Rule 55. These complete failures
of notice deprived Mr. Hansen of any opportunity to defend the action when he got out
of prison under the procedures afforded litigants under I.R.C.P. 60.

The default

judgment in this case was obtained in a summary manner, disregarding the minimal
procedural safeguards set forth in I.R.C.P. Rule 55 to ensure that a person against whom
a default judgment is sought at least be given some opportunity to defend himself. Mr.
Hansen was not afforded these protections and now there is no possible way Mr. Hansen
could defend himself given the passage of time. 1

1

The events underlying the actual Complaint in this case transpired in 1989 and 1990. See
Plaintiffs Amended Verified Complaint Seventeen years have passed, invoking under these
circumstances the application of the doctrine oflaches. Thomas v.. Arkoosh Produce, Inc .. 137 Idaho 352,
48 P.2d 1241 (2002).
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Under that Rule 60(b)(4), a default judgment can be rendered null under the
theory that it is void or voidable. Mr. Hansen believes he is entitled to relief under the
theory that the default judgment is void due to the cumulative effect on Mr. Hansen's
due process rights of Plaintiffs procedural mistakes regarding notice and unreasonable
delay in seeking and enforcing the default judgment. In the alternative, Mr. Hansen also
asserts that if the default judgment is not void but voidable, he is entitled to have the
voidable judgment rendered void for the same reasons the judgment should be declared
simply void.
In furtherance of these arguments, Mr. Hansen directs the court to another fact
undermining the validity of the default judgment resulting from Plaintiffs delay: the
calculation of pre-judgment interest. It is not disputed that the Plaintiff obtained an entry
of default in 1993. She waited eight years to have the court enter the default judgment,
allowing her to accumulate under LC. § 28-22-104 eight years of prejudgment interest.
There was lucrative utility to Plaintiffs delay and absolutely no reason a default
judgment could not have been entered in 1993.
State courts obviously cannot render judgments that violate the federal
Constitution. Kremer v. Chemical Construction Corp., 456 U.S. 461, -- & n.24 (1982)
("A state may not grant preclusive effect ... to a constitutionally infirm judgment and
other state and federal courts are not required to accord full-faith-and-credit to such a
judgment."). Federal courts have determined that when a default judgment is challenged
as void for violating federal constitutional limits, i.e. for lack of subject matter

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

Page 17

jurisdiction, personal jurisdiction or violation of due process, the "reasonable time"
requirement of the I.R.C.P. 60(b)(4) does not apply. 2
According to Professors Wright and Miller, the time within which a Rule
60(b)(4) motion may be brought for violation of due process standards is not constrained
by reasonableness. 11 Wright & Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2862 at 200
(1973) (hereinafter Wright & Miller], at 197-98 (reasonable time limitation "cannot be
enforced with regard to this class of motion"). As stated in In re Center Wholesale, 759
F.2d 1440, 1447, 1448 (9th Cir.1985)3:
Owens-Coming brought a motion under Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b)(4),
which provides that "[o]n motion and upon such terms as are just,
the court may relieve a party or his legal representative from a final
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: ... (4) the
judgment is void." The rule requires that a 60(b)(4) motion "be
made within a reasonable time," but if a judgment is void, a motion
to set it aside may be brought at any time. See 11 C. Wright & A.
Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure§ 2862 at 197 (1973) and
cases cited therein. Moreover, a void judgment cannot acquire
validity because of !aches on the part of the judgment debtor
2

It should also be noted that l.R.C.P. 60 is identical to the federal Rule, and federal authority on the rule is
thus persuasive if not controlling. M K Transport, Inc. v. Grover, 101 Idaho 345, 612 P.2d 1192 (1980).
3
See also U.S. v. One Toshiba Color Television, 213 F.3d 147, 157 (3'' Cir. 2000):
In light of our ruling that the judgment against McGlory in the electronic
equipment forfeiture is void, however, no passage of time can transmute a
nullity into a binding judgment, and hence there is no time limit for such a
motion. It is true that the text of the rule dictates that the motion will be made
within "a reasonable time." See Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). However, nearly
overwhelming authority exists for the proposition that there are no time limits
with regards to a challenge to a void judgment because of its status as a nullity;
thus ]aches is no bar to recourse to Rule 60(b)( 4). See Hertz Corp. v. Alamo
Rent-A-Car, Inc., [6 F.3d 1126, 1130-31 (11th Cir.1994) (collecting cases);
Briley v. Hidalgo, 98 [ F.2d 246, 249 (5th Cir.1993); Katter v. Arkansas La. Gas
Co., 765 F.2d 730, 734 (8th Cir.1985); In re Center Wholesale, Inc., 759 F.2d
1440, 1448 (9th Cir.1985); Misco Leasing, Inc. v. Vaughn, 450 F.2d 257, 260
([0th Cir.!971); Austin v. Smith, 312 F.2d 337, 343 (D.C.Cir.1962); lvloore v.
Positive Safety lvlanufacturing Co., 107 F.R.D. 49, 50 (E.D.Pa.1985); see also
Rodd v. Region Constr. Co., 783 F.2d 89, 91 (7th Cir.1986) ("[T]he reasonable
time criterion of Rule 60(b) as it relates to void judgments, means no time limit
because a void judgment is no judgment at all.") (citation and quotation
omitted).
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(Owens-Coming in this case). Id. Therefore, Owens-Coming's
delay in bringing its Rule 60(b )(4) motion is irrelevant and the
motion was timely.

As noted above, Owens-Coming is appealing the bankruptcy and
district courts' denial of its Rule 60(b) motion on voidness grounds.
A judgment is not void merely because it is erroneous. It is void
only if the court that rendered judgment lacked jurisdiction of the
subject matter, or of the parties, or if the court acted in a manner
inconsistent with due process of law. See 11 C. Wright & A.
Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure§ 2862 at 198-200 (1973)
and cases cited therein.
This is the position taken by the First, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh and
D.C. Circuits. See, Precision Etchings & Findings, Inc. v. LGP Gem, Ltd., 953 F.2d 21,
23 (1st Cir. 1992); Briley v. Hidalgo, 981 F.2d 246, 249 (5th Cir. 1993); Bludworth
Bond Shipyard, Inc. v. M/V Caribbean Wind, 841 F.2d 646, 649 (5th Cir. 1988); Rodd v.
Region Constr. Co., 783 F.2d 89, 91 (7th Cir. 1986) ("[T]he reasonable time criterion of

Rule 60(b) as it relates to void judgments means no time limit."); V.T.A .. Inc. v. Airco,
Inc., 597 F.2d 220,224 (10th Cir.1979) (no time restrictions on a Rule 60(b)(4) motion);
filfisco Leasing, Inc. v. Vaughn, 450 F.2d 257 (10th Cir. 1971) (same); Austin v. Smith,

312 F.2d 337, 343 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (same). The Ninth Circuit has been less explicit, but
has indicated acceptance of this position. Battle v. Liberty Nat'! Life Ins. Co., 974 F.2d
1279 (11th Cir.1992) (per curiam), afj'g, 770 F. Supp. 1499, 1511-12 (M.D.Ala.1991)
(reasonable time limitation inapplicable to a 60(b)(4) challenge), cert. denied, 509 U.S.
906 (1993).
Also, both Wright & Miller and Moore's agree that the principle of !aches also
does not operate as a bar to a Rule 60(b)(4) motion. 11 Wright & Miller§ 2862 at 19798; 7 Moore's Federal Practice

,r 60.25[4]
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at 242; see also Bludworth Bond Shipyard,

Inc. v. MIVCaribbean Wind, 841 F.2d 646,649 n. 6 (5th Cir.1988) (correctly observing

that "no court has denied relief under Rule 60(b)(4) because of delay") (emphasis
added); see, e.g., Crosby v. Bradstreet Co., 312 F.2d 483 (2d. Cir.) (vacating void
judgment 30 years after entry), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 911 (1963); Kao Hwa Shipping
Co. v. China Steel Corp., 816 F. Supp. 910, 913 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (!aches does not

apply); Taft v. Donellan Jerome, Inc., 407 F.2d 807, 808 (7th Cir. 1969) (entertaining
challenge to jurisdiction 13 years after final judgment); Pacurar v. Hernly, 611 F.2d
179, 180-81 (7th Cir. 1979) (permitting a challenge by a plaintiff 15 months after he
became aware of a default judgment entered against him); In re Center Wholesale, 759
F.2d 1440, 1447 (9th Cir. 1985) ("[A) void judgment cannot acquire validity because of
]aches."); Austin v. Smith, 312 F.2d 337, 343 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (]aches never applies,
even if delay is five years); Battle v. Liberty Nat'! Life Ins. Co., 974 F.2d 1279 (11th Cir.
1992) (per curiam), affg, 770 F. Supp. 1499, 1511-12 (M.D.Ala.1991) (!aches
inapplicable to a 60(b)(4) challenge, even if made 13 years after judgment), cert. denied,
509 U.S. 906 (1993).
The Wright case can be further distinguished from the above precedent on the
ground that the party challenging the judgment in that case did not do so upon federal
constitutional grounds, and thus the Court therein did not consider them. See Wright v.
Wright, 130 Idaho 918, 950 P.2d 1257 (1998). To the extent that the Wright case or

other Idaho cases would preclude a federal constitutional challenge to a default
judgment under l.R.C.P. 60(b)(4) as being brought in an unreasonable time, those cases
are unconstitutional. It should be noted that the Idaho Court of Appeals has taken note
of the infirmity of the "reasonable time" requirement. In Fisher Systems Leasing, Inc. v.
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J & J Gunsmithing & Weaponry Design, 135 Idaho 624, 21 P.3d 946, -- n. 4 (Ct. App.

2001 ), the Idaho Court of Appeals stated:

We note that many other jurisdictions have severely relaxed or
completely done away with the "reasonable time" requirement as
to Rule 60(b)(4) motions. See Beller & Keller v. Tyler, 120 F.3d
21, 24 (2nd Cir.1997) (explaining that "(c]ourts have been
exceedingly lenient in defining the term "reasonable time," with
regard to voidness challenges. In fact, it has been oft-stated that,
for all intents and purposes, a motion to vacate a default judgment
as void 'may be made at any time' "); Bludworth Bond Shipyard,
Inc. v. M/V Caribbean Wind, 841 F.2d 646, 649 (5th Cir.1988)
(citing to wright & A. Miller and holding that "there is generally
no timeliness requirement applicable to a Rule 60(b )(4) motion");
Kennecorp Mortgage & Equities, Inc. v. First National Bank of
Fairbanks, 685 P.2d 1232, 1236 (Alaska 1984), quoting Wright &
A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2862 (stating "there is
no time limit on an attack on a judgment as void"); National
Investment Company, Inc. v. Estate of Bronner, 146 Ariz. 138, 704
P.2d 268, 270 (1985) (holding that "the reasonable time
requirement ... does not apply when a judgment is attacked as
void"); United Bank ofBoulder v. Buchanan, 836 P.2d 473, 477-78
(Colo.App, 1992) (holding that "a void judgment is no judgment at
all and, therefore, ... the reasonable time requirement of the rule ...
[is] no time limitation"); In re Marriage of Markowski, 50
Wash.App. 633, 749 P.2d 754 (1988) (holding that a motion to
vacate a default judgment as void "may be brought at any time
after the entry of judgment"). Compare Harter v. Products
Management Corp., 117 Idaho 121, 122, 785 P.2d 685, 686
(Ct.App.1990).
This Court should not apply the "reasonable time" requirement if Mr. Hansen's
challenge to the default judgment is one that, if meritorious, would make the judgment
automatically void for violation of the federal Constitution. The Default Judgment has
directly violated Mr. Hansen's due process rights and should be set aside.
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(d) \Vhen Making a Due Process/ Void Challenge There is No Requirement
for Mr. Hansen to Show Availability Of a Rule 60(b) Meritorious
Defense.

The meritorious defense requirement only applies if a court is reviewing a default
judgment under its discretionary authority. If a default judgment is void or voidable,
then the court has a nort-discretionary duty to grant relief whether there is a meritorious
defense or not.
This rule is a mandate of the United States Supreme Court. "Where a person has
been deprived of property in a manner contrary to the most basic tenets of due process, it
is no answer to say that in his particular case due process of law would have led to the
same result because he had no adequate defense upon the merits." Peralta v. Heights
Med. Ctr., Inc., 485 U.S. 80, 86-87, 108 S.Ct. 896, 99 L.Ed.2d 75 (1988) (internal

quotation marks omitted). It has also been adopted in the Ninth Circuit. See Thos P.
Gonzalez Corp. v. Consejo Nacional De Produccion De Costa Rica, 614 F.2d 1247,

1256 (9th Cir.1980) (A party attacking a judgment as void need not demonstrate that it
has a meritorious claim or defense or that the equities balance in its favor.); see also
Wright & Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure: Civil§ 2862, at 197. Idaho has also
followed it. See Dragotoiu v. Dragotoiu, 133 Idaho 644, 647, 991 P.2d 369, 372 (Ct.
App.

1998) (relief from a voidable judgment pursuant to Rule 60(b)(4) is

nondiscretionary).
2. No three day notice was provided as required under I.R.C.P. 55(b).

Unless, a matter of law (discussed above), setting aside a default judgment is
committed to the sound discretion of the trial court; absent an abuse of discretion the
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court's decision will not be disturbed on appeal. Baldwin v. Baldwin, 114 Idaho 525,
527, 757 P.2d 1244, 1246 (Ct. App.1988); see LR.C.P. 55(c) and 60(b). The
requirements for setting aside a default judgment under these rules are generally twofold: first, the moving party must satisfy at least one of the criteria of Rule 60(b);
second, generally the party must allege facts which, if established, would constitute a
meritorious defense to the action. Id., 114 Idaho at 527, 757 P.2d at 1246.
However, a court's usual discretionary authority to grant or deny such a motion
may be greatly narrowed where certain procedural safeguards were not strictly complied
with in obtaining the judgment. In such cases a party is entitled to non-discretionary
relief as a matter of law. Deutz-Allis Credit Corp. v. Smith, 117 Idaho 118, 785 P.2d
682 (Ct. App. 1990).

In cases where a party has appeared in the action, default

judgment must be taken pursuant to I.R.C.P. 55(b)(2). Radioear Corp. v. Crouse, 97
Idaho 501, 547 P.2d 546 (1976). Under this rule, "the party against whom judgment by
default is sought ... shall be served with written notice of the application for judgment at
least three (3) days prior to the hearing on such application."

Entry of a default

judgment without the requisite three-day notice of application for the judgment renders
the judgment voidable. See, Radioear Corp. v. Crouse, supra; I.R.C.P. 60(b)(l), (3),
(6).

As stated in Knight Ins., Inc. v. Knight, 109 ldaho 56, 58-59, 704 P.2d 960, 962963 (Ct. App. 1985),
We first consider whether relief from the default judgment
should have been granted. Rule SS(c), I.R.C.P., provides that "[f]or
good cause shown the court may set aside an entry of default and,
if a judgment by default has been entered, may likewise set it aside
in accordance with rule 60(b)." In turn, Rule 60(b) enunciates a
variety of grounds upon which relief from a judgment may be
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obtained. Some grounds-such as mistake, inadvertence, surprise or
excusable neglect under subsection (b)(1 )-allow discretionary
relief. Others, such as the voidness of a judgment under
subsection (b)(4), create a nondiscretionary entitlement to
r!ill!i: This distinction is critical for appellate review. Where
discretionary grounds are invoked, the standard of review is abuse
of discretion. Where nondiscretionary grounds are asserted, the
question presented is one of law upon which the appellate court
exercises free review. Here, for reasons to which we now turn, we
believe that nondiscretionary relief should have been granted.
In Idaho, when a default judgment is predicated upon an
erroneously entered default, the judgment is voidable. Thus, in
Farber v. Howell, 105 Idaho 57, 665 P.2d 1067, 1069 (1983), our
Supreme Court held that where a default was entered against
defendants who had previously appeared but who had not filed
responsive pleadings, and where a three-day notice required by
I.R.C.P. 55(b )(2) had not been given, the ensuing judgment was
voidable under Rule 60(b)( 4). By parity of reasoning, this Court
has recognized a similar nexus between Rule 60(b)(4) and Rule
ll(b)(3), I.R.C.P., which specifies the notice that must be given to
parties who have appeared but whose attorneys have been granted
leave to withdraw. We have held that noncompliance with Rule
l l(b)(3) creates an entitlement to relief from a default judgment.
Lundstrom v. Southern Idaho Pipe and Steel Co., 107 Idaho 189,
687 P.2d 579 (Ct.App.1984). In Lundstrom, this Court applied an
appellate standard of legal error, not a standard of abuse of
discretion. Compare Omega Alpha House Corp. v. Molander
Associates, Architects, Inc., 102 Idaho 361, 630 P.2d 153 (1981)
( applying discretion-based standard where noncompliance with
Rule 11 (b)(3) was among many grounds asserted for relief).
As this case law reveals, failure to provide a party who has appeared with the
three day notice makes any subsequent default voidable, and the court must, as a matter
oflaw, grant relief from that judgment.
There is no dispute that no three-day notice was entered in this case in regards to
both applications of default against Mr. Hansen, and Mr. Hansen appeared for the
purposes of LR.C.P. 50(b)(2) at his deposition. Under Nickels v. Durbano, 118 Idaho
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198, 795 P.2d 903 (Ct. App. 1990), the Idaho Court of Appeal has interpreted
"appearance" by stating:
In Idaho this appearance is not limited to a formal court
appearance. The term has been more broadly defined by Newbold
v. Arvidson, 105 Idaho 663, 672 P.2d 231 (1983). In Newbold the
defendant visited the plaintiffs attorney at his office and later
attended a deposition. Plaintiffs attorney at the deposition
acknowledged that defendant was representing himself. Our
Supreme Court help, that these facts were sufficient to show an
appearance for tb:tt'fmrposes of I.R.C.P. 55(b)(2). Essentially, the
Court has held that "conduct on the part of the defendant which
indicates an intent to defend against the action can constitute an
appearance within the meaning of the rule." Catledge v. Transport
Tire Company, Inc., 107 Idaho 602, 606, 691 P.2d 1217, 1221
(1984) (citing Newbold).
118 Idaho at 202, 795 P.2d at 907.
In this case, two facts are made clear from Mr. Hansen's deposition in relation to
whether Mr. Hansen made an "appearance" for the purpose of Rule 55. The first fact is
that neither Mr. Hansen nor Plaintiffs counsel understood or conducted themselves
during the deposition as understanding that Mr. Hansen was a defendant in the case. Mr.
Hansen was subpoenaed by Plaintiffs counsel to the deposition - an unusual procedure
to depose a party. Further, Plaintiffs counsel asked if either Mr. Hansen would appear
at trial as a witness or if Plaintiffs counsel needed to subpoena him - again, very
unusual requests to be made to a party. See the Deposition of George Hansen, taken on
April 24, 1997, pages 172-174, Ins. 9-13 (R. Vol. II, pp 142-143). Further, at no time
during the deposition did Plaintiffs counsel infonn, ask or mention anything to Mr.
Hansen regarding his status as a defendant in the case or his knowledge of the actual
court proceedings against him brought by the Plaintiff. In this respect, the beginning of
the deposition, at pages 2-4 (R. Vol. II, p. 100) are instructive. Particularly, Mr. Hansen
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would like to draw the Court's attention to deposition page 16, Ins. 8-14 (R. Vol. II, p.
103) where Plaintiffs counsel infers that the deposition is pursuant to a lawsuit Mr.
Hansen is unaware includes him. Also, Mr. Hansen does not mention anywhere in the
deposition his understanding that he is a defendant in the case and asks at length about
the case, although never learning or being told he is a defendant. 4 Id. at pp. 16-22, ins.
15-3 (R. Vol. II, pp. 104-105). Indeed, at one point in the deposition Mr. Hansen
declares he is no longer liable for any debt to anyone resulting from the investment
scheme that was the subject matter of this lawsuit by operation of the statute of
limitations. See Id. at p. 65, Ins. 1-20 (R. Vol. II, p. 116).
The other clear fact from the deposition is that if Mr. Hansen knew he was a party
to the suit, he would have defended against it. This fact is gleaned from the entirety of
Mr. Hansen's testimony in the deposition and is directly observed at pp. 176-178, lns.
17-23, (R. Vol. II, pp. 143-144), where Mr. Hansen makes clear that he does not believe
that he or Mr. Lott misrepresented the investment scheme in which the Plaintiff invested.
Given these facts from the record, Mr. Hansen did not know and was not made
aware he was a defendant in the case. However, he made it very clear that he did not
think he was liable for any past conduct that was the subject of the lawsuit. Mr. Hansen
appeared in this case and was not afforded the appropriate three (3) day notice under
Rule 55. Accordingly, the judgment is void and should be set aside by the Court.

'Although Mr. Hansen did receive service of summons, he did so while in federal prison and
understandably does not recall the service of summons.
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3 Hansen is Entitled to Relief Under I.R.C.P. 60(b)(5) From the Default Judgment
Entered Against Him on the Grounds That the Default Judgment Should Not Have
Prospective Application

The lack of notice to Hansen of entry of the default judgment for over five years
after entry of final judgment dismissing the case as a result of Respondents' failure to
certify any address for Mr. Hansen to the Clerk of the Court in the application for
default judgment as required under Rule 55(b)(2) should entitle Hansen to the equitable
relief provided under Rule 60(b)(5) I.R.C.P., which would render the default judgment
not prospectively applicable..
Hansen acknowledges that under the provisions of I.R.C.P. 60(b)(S) a motion
must be brought within a reasonable time and that a Rule 60(b)(4) motion must be also
brought in a reasonable time if it is against a default judgment that is merely voidable as
opposed to a void judgment (which can be challenged at any time). However, Mr.
Hansen submits that the criteria by which the Court determines a reasonable time differs
for both rule sections.
First, with respect to Rule 60(b)(5), a motion under that Rule must be made
"within a reasonable time;" and requires a showing that the judgment is prospective and
that it is no longer equitable to enforce the judgment as written. Rudd v. Rudd, 105
Idaho 112, 666 P.2d 639 (1983). Mr. Hansen asserts that a reasonable time under this
rule must be calculated from the time the judgment becomes prospective and no longer
equitable to enforce it and not from the time the default judgment is entered or from the
time the party learns of the default. Mr. Hansen has brought his 60(b)(5) motion within
a reasonable time after he became cognizant of the faulty nature of the default judgment
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and the extreme delay exercised by Meyers in enforcing her default judgment. See
Affidavit of Hansen (R. Vol. I, pp 91-93).
Second, with regard to Mr. Hansen's 60(b)(4) challenge, the Court has intimated
that if the default judgment is merely voidable as opposed to void, Mr. Hansen has not
brought this challenge in a reasonable time. The Court's impression in this regard is in
error.
To rely on Rule 60(b)(5), a movant must show two things: (!) that the judgment
is prospective in nature; and (2) that it is no longer equitable to enforce the judgment as
written. See Rudd v. Rudd, 105 Idaho 112, 666 P.2d 639 (1983). l.R.C.P. 60(b)(5)
reads:
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a
party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or
proceeding for the following reasons: ... (5) ... it is no longer
equitable that the judgment should have prospective application ....
Idaho's rule and the federal rule are identical, and Moore's Federal Practice, §
60.26[4], p. 337, has stated:

[T]he breadth of (b )( 5) is broad and encompasses any final
judgment having prospective application .... [T]he crucial issues are
whether the judgment has prospective application and whether it is
no longer equitable that it have such application. Thus 60(b)(5) is
applicable to a declaratory judgment insofar as the judgment ...
operates prospectively. When it is inequitable that a judgment
should continue to be a lien on the judgment debtor's property,
relief from the lien may be given. And in any other situation when
the judgment has prospective application relief may be given from
its prospective features when subsequent events make it no longer
equitable that the judgment has prospective application.
The equitable reason the judgment should not have prospective application is
rooted in the equitable doctrine of !aches.
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The elements of !aches are: (1) defendant's invasion of plaintiffs rights; (2) delay
by plaintiff in asserting plaintiff's rights, the plaintiff having had notice and an
opportunity to institute action; (3) lack of knowledge by the defendant that plaintiff
would assert his or her rights; and (4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event
relief is accorded to plaintiff or the suit is not held to be barred. In determining whether
the doctrine of !aches applies, consideration must be given to all surrounding
circumstances and acts of the parties. Thomas v. Arkoosh Produce, Inc., 137 Idaho 352,
48 P.2d 1241 (2002)
The facts are clear that Meyer has engaged in inappropriate delay in entering and
enforcing the default judgment. The case was filed on February of 1993. The Order for
Entry of Default was made in September of 1993. Even then, Meyer waited almost a
year after final judgment was entered and the complaint dismissed on December 4, 2000,
before applying to the District Court on September 25 of 2001 for entry of a default
judgment. All during these events the Plaintiff failed to provide Mr. Hansen with any
notice of the default proceedings, and in so doing failed to follow required notice
procedures set out in Rule 55(b )(2) for applying for a default judgment. Meyer claims
that Hansen was served with a Notice of Entry of Default on September 12, 2006, almost
five years to the day after entry of the default judgment and almost six years after the
case was dismissed with prejudice. Yet, the purported Affidavit of Service on Mrs.
Hansen cited by Plaintiff (R. Vol. I, p. 60) shows only that an "Order for Examination of
Debtor" was served. Hansen claims he never saw or received the default judgment
Affidavit of George Hansen. (R. Vol I, pp. 91-93) Here again, claiming Hansen did not
react timely to the entry of a default judgment turns the argument on its head. The
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default judgment is void because the entry of the default judgment on the stale default
order violated Hansen's rights to due process, which violation can be raised at any time.
In any event, even if a reasonable time requirement were applicable to Hansen,
Mr. Hansen's delay in bringing this motion is reasonable considering the failure of the
Plaintiff to provide any notice of the default proceedings and the antiquity and length of
the underlying case. Eight years passed between the Entry of Default and the entry of
the default judgment. The Plaintiff waited another six years before even attempting to
collect on the judgment. To pin Mr. Hansen with unreasonable delay when seen in the
context of the delay and confusion sown by the Plaintiff (recall that Plaintiffs counsel
failed to even realize Mr. Hansen was a party when Plaintiff took Mr. Hansen's
deposition) is unfair, inequitable, unjust and not in accord with the principle that courts
should grant relief from default judgments in doubtful cases. See, Jonsson v. Oxborrow,
141 Idaho 635, 115 P.3d 726 (2005); Fisher Systems Leasing, Inc. v. J & J Gunsmithing
& Weaponry Design, 135 Idaho 624, 21 P.3d 946, -- n. 4 (Ct. App. 2001)("We note that

many other jurisdictions have severely relaxed or completely done away with the
"reasonable time" requirement as to Rule 60(b)(4) motions.").
Given the serious mistakes and unreasonable delay by Plaintiff, the default
judgment in this case is in great doubt, and the court should not absolve the Plaintiff her
neglect and lassitude while requiring great vigilance and expedient action from Mr.
Hansen. Given the circumstances of the case, Mr. Hansen acted within a reasonable
time to bring his 60(b)(4) and (5) motions.
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4. Prior to Entry of the Default Judgment, the Case Below was Dismissed as a
Matter of Record With Prejudice in its Entirety, Thereby Rendering the Default
Judgment a Nullity.
The "Judgment on Jury Verdict" (R. Vol. I, pp. 48-49) entered on December 10,
2000, after finding for defendants Lotts and against plaintiffs Meyers, then enters its
order "dismissing plaintiffs' complaint with prejudice." Such an Order on the record
can only mean that Case No. CV-93-822 was no longer extant. Meyers made not timely
motions under Rule 59 I.R.C.P. to amend the judgment or under Rule 60(b) I.R.C.P. to
seek any relief for mistake or inadvertence. The Judgment was duly entered and served
on counsel. As a matter of law, then, there was no case, no subject matter jurisdiction
when the application for default judgment was made on September 25, 2001, and there
being no case or controversy of record at that time, the District Court had no authority to
issue the default judgment. State v. Jakoski, 139 Idaho 352, 79 P. 3d 711 (2003) (the
state constitutional provision granting district courts the power to hear all types of cases,
both at law and in equity, does not grant them perpetual jurisdiction to amend or set
aside final judgments in cases that they have heard. - ID Const. Art 5 § 20).

V.

CONCLUSION
The Default Judgment in this case was entered in contravention of essential
provisions of Rules 55(b)(2), 60(b)(4), 60(b)(5) I.R.C.P. and the due process principles
of notice, equity and fairness. The default judgment is void and as such should be set
aside and vacated.
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The District Court was without the power to enter the default judgment in a case
that had been dismissed with prejudice. Even if the default judgment were found to be
voidable, the equities involved in this matter when considered against the \aches of
Meyers should not be construed to allow litigants to sit on an entry of default as long as
possible to maximize prejudgment interest or to fail to give any notice of default
proceedings to the defendant. The default judgment in this case was entered in a manner
inconsistent with procedural due process of law resulting in inappropriate delay and
economic suppression. Such is contrary to the rule of law and equity in Idaho. The
Court is requested to reverse the order of the district court and grant the requested relief
from the default judgment in this case.
Respectfully Submitted,

DATED this 27th day of January 2009.
RUNFT & STEELE LAW OFFICES, PLLC
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